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THE JURY’S ROLE IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE IN THE U.S. 
INTRODUCTION TO SAINT LOUIS PUBLIC LAW REVIEW JURY 
ISSUE 
STEPHEN C. THAMAN* 
The contributors to this splendid issue of the Saint Louis University Public 
Law Review all took part in the conference: “Lay Participation in the Criminal 
Trial in the Twenty-First Century,” which took place at the International 
Institute for Higher Studies in the Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy, from 
May 25-29, 1999.  In essence, Professors Darryl Brown, Valerie Hans, Stephan 
Landsman, Richard Lempert and William Pizzi (along with Professor Neil 
Vidmar, Professor Shari Seidman Diamond, Tom Munstermann and Judge 
Michael Dann) constituted the American contingent at this conference which 
united approximately fifty-five professors, lawyers and judges from twenty-
eight different countries to discuss the future of lay participation in the 
criminal trial in the Twenty-First Century. 
Each participant gave a short oral presentation of his or her paper in panels 
on topics such as the history and philosophy of lay participation, evidentiary 
problems in trials before juries and mixed courts, problems in evaluating the 
evidence and formulating the verdict and judgment in jury systems, the two 
new jury systems in Russia and Spain and lesser-known jury systems, such as 
those of Nicaragua, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Canton of Geneva.1 
The sheer number of papers presented led to difficulties in publishing them 
together in the journal of the International Association of Penal Law, the Revue 
Internationale de Droit Pénal.  After long discussions with the publishers, a 
compromise solution was reached: (1) the papers relating to the American jury 
trial would be published in the Saint Louis University Public Law Review in a 
special issue; (2) the numerous and lengthy articles in Spanish dedicated to the 
Spanish jury system and the introduction of lay participation in Argentina were 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Although the idea for this conference dates back to 1995 when I was at the Max-Planck-
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg, Germany, and began discussing 
it with my Doktorvater Professor Albin Eser, another important stepping stone was the Law and 
Society Meeting in St. Louis in 1997, where I gave a paper on the new Spanish and Russian jury 
systems in a panel with Professors Brown, Hans, Landsman and Vidmar, which ended up in 
Vidmar’s book WORLD JURY SYSTEMS (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000). 
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published in book form in Argentina;2 and (3) the remainder of the papers 
dealing with the other European countries, South Africa, Japan and China were 
finally published in the Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal.3 
The idea of the conference was to bring together specialists in the field of 
lay participation from Anglo-American jury systems and from European jury 
and mixed court systems to discuss the theoretical and practical aspects of the 
respective systems, to open up the exchange of ideas by providing a forum for 
the exchange of ideas among representatives of systems that had otherwise had 
little opportunity to learn about each other, and to finally try to elaborate some 
general theses about lay participation for the use of countries undergoing 
criminal procedure reform.  Besides representatives from Common Law and 
European countries, the conference was enriched by representatives from areas 
which are currently in the process of active reform efforts and in which the 
question of lay participation is hotly contested: Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. 
Many new friendships and close working relationships developed in 
Siracusa.  Participants from outside the Common Law were able to benefit 
greatly from the contributions from the American and British participants, in 
light of the many years of profound sociological and psychological research 
into the functioning of juries and the refinement of the law of evidence which 
has taken place in our jury systems.  On the other hand, the Anglo-American 
contingent was introduced to a plethora of new forms of juries and mixed 
courts which cannot but provoke one to more critically assess one’s own 
system.  Besides several projects undertaken by individual participants which 
grew out of these new friendships, at least two further meetings have their 
roots in the 1999 Siracusa Conference. 
From June 1 through June 6, 2000, the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations organized a conference to address the issue of which form of lay 
participation should be adopted in Japan in the upcoming judicial reforms.  
Satoru Shinomiya, one of the leaders of the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations and Professor Takashi Maruta, who participated in the Siracusa 
conference, asked me to help them organize this conference, which eventually 
included several of the Siracusa participants: Professors Richard Lempert, 
Albin Eser, John Jackson, Edmundo Hendler, Brazilian lawyer Ana Paula 
Zomer and myself, as well as Spanish political philosopher Carmen Gleadow, 
French Judge Marcel Lemonde and Danish Professor Eva Smith.4  The 
 
 2. See JUICIO POR JURADOS EN EL PROCESO PENAL (Rubén O. Villela ed., 2000). 
 3. 73 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL (First and Second trimesters 2001). 
 4. The papers from this conference will be published in a forthcoming of the SAINT LOUIS - 
WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC LAW JOURNAL.  My contribution to this issue also contains the 
“Theses of the Conference” elaborated in Siracusa, which were left out of the issue of the Revue 
Internationale de Droit Pénal. 
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Japanese Justice System Reform Council finally issued a report in June 20015 
in which it decided to introduce a mixed court, rather than a jury, but the 
discussion in Japan is continuing as to what type of mixed court system would 
be best in that country.6 
Also as a result of the Siracusa conference, Professor Valerie Hans and Dr. 
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich organized the “Collaborative Research Network on 
Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making” which organized three panels at 
the Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research Committee 
on the Sociology of Law, which took place from July 4-8, 2001 in Budapest, 
Hungary, and dealt with world jury systems, jury decision-making and 
decision-making in mixed courts.  Among the Siracusa participants who 
attended and gave papers were journal authors, Professors Valerie Hans, 
Stephan Landsman, Richard Lempert and Neil Vidmar as well as John Jackson 
(Northern Ireland),  Katie Quinn (Ireland), Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich (Croatia-
US), Asbjorn Strandbakken (Norway), Stefan Machura (Germany), Ana Paula 
Zomer (Brazil), Tom Munsterman (US), Marina Nemytina (Russia) and 
myself.7  The Collaborative Research Network also attracted new participants 
in Maria del Mar Bulnes (Spain), Attila Bado (Hungary), Takeshi Nishimura 
and Hiyoshi Sato (Japan). 
The contributions published in this issue of the Saint Louis University 
Public Law Review, while restricted to discussing the American criminal (and 
civil) jury system, raise issues that are also relevant to other systems using lay 
participation.  All are implicitly reform-oriented, that is, they are aimed at 
improving the workings of the U.S. jury or, in the case of Professor Pizzi’s 
contribution, calling into question its centrality in our system.  The 
contributions of Professors Brown, Hans, Landsman and Lempert are all aimed 
at, directly or indirectly, increasing the role of jurors in judicial factfinding and 
in increasing their responsibility for assuring the just nature of their verdict. 
Professor Landsman writes about how American rules of evidence, and 
specifically the new United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. 
 
 5. The English version is available on the Internet.  THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE 
SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (June 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002). 
 6. I was invited to give a talk to the Japan Federation of Bar Associations on December 13, 
2001, in Tokyo, to give some suggestions as to the type of mixed court Japan should introduce. 
 7. My presentation was on the new system of jury and mixed courts introduced in 
Venezuela in 1998.  To show how short-lived reforms can be, the Venezuelan jury courts were 
eliminated in a partial reform of the Venezuelan Code of Criminal Procedure in November of 
2001. Ley No. 54, Ley de Reforma Parcial del Código Orgánico Procesal Penal,  reprinted in 
GACETA OFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA 37,322 (Nov. 12, 2001). 
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8 have taken from the jury to the judge the 
competence to decide a number of evidentiary issues.  This “blindfolding” of 
the jury, or its treatment like “mushrooms” by being “kept in the dark and fed 
an ample supply of horse manure,” extends also to procedural rules which 
prevent them from knowing, in criminal cases, the effects of a finding of not 
guilty by reason of insanity or the magnitude of the punishments which can be 
imposed upon a finding of guilt.9  Landsman pleads for a more active role for 
the jury than current evidentiary and procedural rules allow, and, based on 
recent social science research, expresses confidence in jurors’ ability to 
function as “active information processors who work diligently to integrate the 
proof and their life experiences into a narrative that explains and resolves the 
case before them in light of the legal categories presented for decision.”  
Implicit in Professor Landsman’s paper is also support for taking off the jury’s 
blindfold with regard to the threatened punishment.10  In the new jury systems 
in Russia (1993) and Spain (1995) juries are not blindfolded as to the 
threatened sentence and, especially in the case of Russia, may even 
recommend lenience which will allow sentencing below the statutory 
minimum sentence.11 
Professor Richard Lempert’s paper, which discusses the recent United 
States Supreme Court opinion in Old Chief v. United States,12 certainly joins in 
Professor Landsman’s assessment of the capacity of the jury as competent 
factfinders.  He stresses that the jury should not be blindfolded to facts which 
enrich the “narrative relevance” of the story of the case provided by the parties, 
basing his analysis also on social science research into the way juries think 
about and decide cases.  As with Professor Landsman, Professor Lempert 
would not shy away allowing juries to deal with an increasing amount of 
hearsay, and even evidence related to the facts of the case which could arouse 
the passions of the jury, such as gory autopsy photos.13  Both the increased 
admissibility of hearsay and the emphasis on giving the jury a more complete 
picture of the evidence, would tend to make American trials look a bit more 
like their Continental European counterparts, in which the court is trusted to 
 
 8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 9. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994). 
 10. There is increasing support for returning to jury sentencing in non-capital cases due to 
the failure of sentencing guidelines and the excessive severity of current U.S. legislation in 
relation to sentencing.  See Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come (Again)? 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999). 
 11. See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia, in 
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 319 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000). 
 12. 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 13. He agrees with Old Chief, however, that accounts of prior criminal conduct or prior 
convictions, should be an exception. 
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“freely evaluate the evidence” in its entirety and, in many jurisdictions, is 
obligated to attempt to ascertain the truth while acting as an impartial arbiter 
between the parties. 
In their papers, both Professors Landsman and Hans support the Arizona 
Jury Reform Project’s14 emphasis on allowing juries to actively ask questions 
during the trial and even to begin discussing the facts of the case before they 
retire to deliberate.  Professor Hans is aware that the more interaction there is 
between lay and professional judges, the more a jury will begin to look like a 
Continental European mixed court, where professional and lay judges are 
theoretically equals in deciding all questions related to fact, law, guilt and 
punishment.15  Allowing the parties to divine the leanings of the jury through 
their questions, will also make their decision making more predictable than 
where the jury remains “sphinxlike” and inscrutable.16 
Now clearly the amount of factual evidence given to a jury depends on the 
breadth of the legal issues deemed to be within their competence.  Whereas 
juries in Continental European systems are often restricted to deciding issues 
of “naked fact,” and it is the professional bench which then applies the law to 
the facts the juries find to be true in their special verdicts,17 the American jury 
has won some significant battles recently in regaining competence which 
legislation and judicial decisions had transferred to the professional judge.  
Professor Brown seizes on the decision in United States v. Gaudin,18 which 
allows the jury to determine elements of a criminal offense which in Europe 
would definitely be considered to be “legal” in nature and therefore for the 
professional judge, and the decisions in Jones v. United States19 and Apprendi 
v. New Jersey,20 which appear put an end to legislative attempts to reinterpret 
substantive factual elements of criminal offenses as if they were mere 
“sentencing factors” for the professional judge.  While the “conduct rules” of 
the criminal law must be fixed and clear, so as not to violate due process, the 
“decision rules” are broader and implicitly give the adjudicator discretion 
within which to assess the “blameworthiness” of the breach of the conduct 
 
 14. On Arizona jury reform, see B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking 
Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229 (1993). 
 15. But research has shown that early English jury trials often looked like modern 
Continental European mixed courts, with free exchanges between jury and judge, judges using 
pressure to get juries to change their verdicts, deliberations by the jury in open court in the 
presence of the judge, etc. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 263, 285-96 (l978). 
 16. See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 44 (1997). 
 17. See Thaman, supra note 11. 
 18. 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
 19. 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
 20. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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rules.  This discretion borders on “jury nullification” in some instances, unless 
the jury is also given discretion in assessing punishment.21 
If we lump together the views of Professors Brown, Hans, Landsman and 
Lempert we see an active jury which will be treated as the mature and 
responsible finder of virtually all of the facts relevant to an assessment of guilt, 
and also will be given the power to determine whether or not a conviction 
should flow from the finding of the facts, and if so, what the parameters of the 
judicial sentencing power will be. 
Professor Pizzi gives us a much more skeptical view of the American jury.  
While juries are theoretically available in all but the most petty of 
misdemeanors, the pressure put on defendants by Draconian sentencing 
parameters, excessive power in the hands of prosecutors, and compliant judges 
who “punish” unsuccessful defendants who go to trial , lead most defendants 
(even some innocent ones)22 to give up the right to trial by jury and enter plea 
bargains to minimize their losses.  Ironically, one of the results of our system 
of plea-bargaining, enforced by the threat of Draconian sentences is that, as in 
Europe, usually only the most serious cases (ones where no acceptable plea 
bargain is forthcoming) or where the defendant definitely insists on his or her 
innocence, does the case go to trial. 
The lessons Professor Pizzi draws from these shortcomings of the 
American system are, however, different than those that the other authors 
apparently would choose.  In a progressive, humane criminal justice system 
with rational sentencing alternatives,23 innocent people would not forego a trial 
due to fear of vindictive sentencing.  Yet the solution is not necessarily to 
develop a simpler method of trying cases, such as introduction of smaller 
Continental European style mixed courts, but rather to develop a fair and just 
way to differentiate between cases that should be tried, i.e., where there are 
clear questions of guilt or innocence, and those that need not be–where guilt is 
 
 21. Much of so-called jury nullification, historically, was “sanction nullification,” that is, the 
jury refusing to convict because it was convinced the sanctions were too severe.  To avoid this, 
many European jury systems brought the jury into the sentencing decision, preferring to have a 
“true” decision on the facts at the cost of lenience in sentencing. On England, see Thomas A. 
Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-Finding Traditions on the Eve of the French 
Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY: 1700-1900 at 44-45 (Antonio 
Padoa Schioppa ed., l987); on France, see FRANÇOISE LOMBARD, LES JURÉS: JUSTICE 
REPRÉSENTATIVE ET REPRÉSENTATIONS DE LA JUSTICE 272-74 (1998). 
 22. Stephen C. Thaman, Is America a Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the 
Administration of Criminal Justice? 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 999, 1015-16 (2000). 
 23. For a compelling legal-philosophical justification of “minimal” criminal law, see LUIGI 
FERRAJOLI, DIRITTO E RAGIONE: TEORIA DEL GARANTISMO PENALE 326-482 (5th ed. 1998). 
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clear due to the flagrancy of the crime, a voluntary confession given in the 
presence of counsel or the otherwise convincing nature of the proof.24 
Professor Pizzi also does not apparently trust in the jury’s ability to be 
competent factfinders in cases involving DNA and other complicated evidence, 
though he points to no evidence why single American judges (chosen as they 
often are largely due to political rather than scholarly or intellectual clout) 
would, either alone or with a couple of lay assessors, do any better in such 
cases than twelve more or less randomly selected citizens. 
Pizzi also criticizes the time-consuming and hyper-complicated way we 
select juries in criminal cases as being a reason why they are used less today 
than before and suggests the elimination of peremptory challenges, relying on 
England’s step in that direction and Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion in 
Batson v. Kentucky.25  Some of the difficulties of picking juries are also 
averred to in the report on the U.S. jury provided by Orem, Abrami and Brown 
and form the gist of Professor Vidmar’s first-hand account of his work as a 
jury consultant in a number of civil and criminal cases.  The question is, of 
course, whether a fair jury can be picked in our diverse society, without 
considerable attorney voir dire and use of peremptory challenges.  One could, 
of course, eliminate the requirement of unanimity, which was done in England 
and has been permitted by the U.S. Supreme Court,26 but many think this 
would result in the marginalization of minority jurors.  Clearly the requirement 
of unanimous juries compels both sides (and especially the prosecutor) to bend 
over backwards to find uncooperative and potentially nullifying jurors. 
Another possibility would be a method of ensuring that each panel of jurors 
summoned to a criminal court at the beginning of jury selection more or less 
represented a racial, sexual and social cross-section of the community in the 
judicial district. The Supreme Court has, however, limited the fair cross-
section requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the compilation of jury lists for 
the entire judicial district, and not for the panel called for a particular case.27 
Although it is interesting to think of how mixed courts would work on 
American soil,28 it is unlikely that our Supreme Court would, even in the 
 
 24. For a comparative selection of statutes and case law relating to various European modes 
of avoiding the full trial, see STEPHEN C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A 
CASEBOOK APPROACH (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 141-63, on file with author). 
 25. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 26. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), which allowed verdicts of ten of twelve 
jurors. All European jury systems also allow majority or qualified majority verdicts. 
 27. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002), in which the trial judge tried 
to ensure just such a cross-section by manipulating the use of peremptory challenges and 
challenges for cause, leading to reversal in a notoriously controversial New York case. 
 28. Because of innate American anti-authoritarian attitudes, lay assessors here might not be 
the acquiescent “nodders” or “ornaments” they are accused of being in countries like Germany 
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distant future, allow mixed courts to masquerade as the juries contemplated by 
the Framers in Article III and the Sixth Amendment.29  Thus we must read 
these contributions, with the exception only of Professor Pizzi’s, as providing 
an optimistic view of the ability of American juries, given thoughtful reform 
efforts to improve their ability to digest evidence in complicated and longer 
trials, to competently handle all the evidence and all the issues in criminal (and 
civil) cases and, what’s more, to use its discretion in its role as conscience of 
the community, to flexibly fashion just results based on this fact-finding, in a 
way that positivistic Continental European legal philosophers would frown 
upon.  Though these contributions relating to American law have been plucked 
out of the context of a comparative law conference, their sophisticated 
analysis, based as it is on legal, sociological and psychological studies into 
how juries (and human beings in general) make decisions, cannot help but be 
valuable to jurists in other countries with Anglo-Saxon or Continental 
European jury courts or with mixed courts in grappling with the difficult 
problems relating to the finding of facts, appreciation of its legal significance, 
and the reaching of the moral decision of how society should respond in the 
event of a condemnation. 
 
 
and the former Soviet bloc. In the first full year of Venezuela’s new system of juries (for the most 
serious crimes) and mixed courts (for mid-range crimes), juries (292 trials) acquitted thirty-three 
percent of the time and the mixed court (one professional judge and two lay assessors, in 1,233 
trials) acquitted forty-one percent of the time!  REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 
OFICINA NACIONAL DE PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA (2001) (statistics on file with author). 
 29. Germany, France and Italy transformed their juries into mixed courts while maintaining 
the name of “jury” or “assizes court.” The conservative Partido Popular in Spain is trying to 
interpret its constitutional provision for “trial by jury” in the same way to transform Spain’s new 
jury into a mixed court. See ANABEL DÍEZ  & JULIO M. LÁZARO. El Pacto de la Justicia mantiene 
en manos del Congreso la electión del Poder Judicial, EL PAÍS. May 29, 2001, at 15.  Venezuela 
eliminated its two-year old jury system in November of 2001 in favor of the mixed court. Ley No. 
54, Ley de Reforma Parcial del Código Orgánico Procesal Penal, reprinted in GACETA OFICIAL 
DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA 37,322 (Nov. 12, 2001). 
